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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose a bank-based explanation for the decade-long Japanese slowdown following
the asset price collapse in the early 1990s. We start with the well-known observation that most large
Japanese banks were only able to comply with capital
standards because regulators were lax in their
inspections. To facilitate this forbearance the banks often engaged in sham loan restructurings that
kept credit flowing to otherwise insolvent borrowers (that we call zombies). Thus, the normal competitive
outcome whereby the zombies would shed workers and lose market share was thwarted. Our model
highlights the restructuring implications of the zombie problem. The counterpart of the congestion
created by the zombies is a reduction of the profits for healthy firms, which discourages their entry
and investment. In this context, even solvent banks do not find good lending opportunities. We confirm
our story's key predictions that zombie-dominated industries exhibit more depressed job creation and
destruction, and lower productivity. We present firm-level regressions showing that the increase in
zombies depressed the investment and employment growth of non-zombies and widened the productivity
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  This paper explores the role that misdirected bank lending played in prolonging 
the Japanese macroeconomic stagnation that began in the early 1990s.  The investigation 
focuses on the widespread practice of Japanese banks of continuing to lend to otherwise 
insolvent firms. We document the prevalence of this forbearance lending and show its 
distorting effects on healthy firms that were competing with the impaired firms.   
  Hoshi (2000) was the first paper to call attention to this phenomenon and its 
ramifications have been partially explored by a number of observers of the Japanese 
economy.  There is agreement that the trigger was the large stock and land price declines 
that began in early 1990s: stock prices lost roughly 60% of their value from the 1989 
peak within three years, while commercial land prices fell by roughly 50% after their 
1992 peak over the next ten years.  These shocks impaired collateral values sufficiently 
that any banking system would have had tremendous problems adjusting.  But in Japan 
the political and regulatory response was to deny the existence of any problems and delay 
any serious reforms or restructuring of the banks.
1  Aside from a couple of crisis periods 
when regulators were forced to recognize a few insolvencies and temporarily nationalize 
the offending banks, the banks were surprisingly unconstrained by the regulators.   
  The one exception to this rule is that banks had to comply (or appear to comply) 
with the international standards governing their minimum level of capital (the so-called 
Basle capital standards).  This meant that when banks wanted to call in a non-performing 
loan, they were likely to have to write off existing capital, which in turn pushed them up 
against the minimum capital levels.  The fear of falling below the capital standards led 
many banks to continue to extend credit to insolvent borrowers, gambling that somehow 
these firms would recover or that the government would bail them out.
2   Failing to 
                                                 
1 For instance, in 1997, at least 5 years after the problem of non-performing loans was recognized, the 
Ministry of Finance was insisting that no public money would be needed to assist the banks. In February 
1999 then Vice Minister of International Finance, Eisuke Sakakibara, was quoted as saying that the 
Japanese banking problems “would be over within a matter of weeks.”  As late as 2002, the Financial 
Services Agency claimed that Japanese banks were well capitalized and no more public money would be 
necessary. 
2 The banks also tried to raise capital by issuing more shares and subordinated debt, as Ito and Sasaki 
(2002) document.  When the banks raised new capital, however, almost all came from either related firms 
(most notably life insurance companies) that are dependent on the banks for their financing, or the   3
rollover the loans also would have sparked public criticism that banks were worsening 
the recession by denying credit to needy corporations.  Indeed, the government also 
encouraged the banks to increase their lending to small and medium sized firms to ease 
the apparent “credit crunch” especially after 1998.
3  The continued financing, or “ever-
greening,” can therefore be seen as a rational response by the banks to these various 
pressures.  
  A simple measure of the ever-greening is shown in Figure 1, which reports the 
percentage of bank customers that received subsidized bank credit.  We defer the details 
of how the firms are identified until the next section, but for now all that matters is that 
the universe of firms considered here is all publicly traded manufacturing, construction, 
real estate, retail, wholesale (excluding nine general trading companies) and service 
sector firms.   The top panel of the figure shows roughly 30% of these firms were on life 
support from the banks in the early 2000s.  The lower panel, which shows comparable 
asset weighted figures, suggests that about 15% of assets reside in these firms.  As these 
figures show, these percentages were much lower in the 1980s and early 1990s.   
  By keeping these unprofitable borrowers (that we call “zombies”) alive, the banks 
allowed them to distort competition throughout the rest of the economy.  The zombies’ 
distortions came in many ways, including depressing market prices for their products, 
raising market wages by hanging on to the workers whose productivity at the current 
firms declined and, more generally, congesting the markets where they participated.   
Effectively the growing government liability that came from guaranteeing the deposits of 
banks that supported the zombies served as a very inefficient program to sustain 
employment.  Thus, the normal competitive outcome whereby the zombies would shed 
workers and lose market share was thwarted.
4  More importantly, the low prices and high 
                                                                                                                                                 
government when banks received capital injections.  See Hoshi and Kashyap (2004, 2005) for more on this 
“double-gearing” between banking and life insurance sectors.   
3 Subsequently when the Long-Term Credit Bank was returned to private ownership, a condition for the 
sale was the new owners would maintain lending to small and medium borrowers.  The new owners 
tightened credit standards and the government pressured them to continue supplying funds, see Tett (2003) 
for details. 
4 See Ahearne and Shinada (2004) for some direct evidence suggesting that inefficient firms in the non-
manufacturing sector gained market share in Japan in the 1990s.   Fukao and Kwon (2006) and Nishimura, 
Nakajima, and Kiyota (2005) find that the productivities of the exiting firms were higher than those of the 
surviving firms in many industries.  See also Kim (2004) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2003) for attempts 
to quantify the size of these types of distortions.    4
wages reduce the profits and collateral that new and more productive firms could   
generate, thereby discouraging their entry and investment.
5    Therefore, even solvent 
banks saw no particularly good lending opportunities in Japan. 
  In the remainder of the paper we document and formalize this story.  In the next 
section, we describe the construction of our zombie measure.  There are a number of 
potential proxies that could be used to identify zombies.  As we explain, however, 
measurement problems confound most of these alternatives.   
  Having measured the extent of zombies, we then model their effects.  The model 
is a standard variant of the type that is studied in the literature on creative destruction. It 
is designed to contrast the adjustment of an industry to a negative shock with and without 
the presence of zombies. We model the presence of zombies as a constraint on the natural 
surge in destruction that would arise in the wake of an unfavorable technological, demand, 
or credit shock. The main effect of that constraint is that job creation must slow 
sufficiently to re-equilibrate the economy.  This means that during the adjustment the 
economy is characterized by what Caballero and Hammour (1998, 2000) have called 
“sclerosis” — the preservation of production units that would not be saved without the 
banks’ subsidies— and the associated “scrambling” — the retention of firms and projects 
that are less productive than some of those that do not enter or are not implemented due 
to the congestion caused by the zombies. 
  In the fourth section of the paper, we assess the main aggregate implications of 
the model.  In particular, we study the interaction between the percentage of zombies in 
the economy and the amount of restructuring, both over time and across different sectors.  
We find that the rise of the zombies has been associated with falling levels of aggregate 
restructuring, with job creation being especially depressed in the parts of the economy 
with the most zombie firms.  We then explore the impact of zombies on sectoral 
performance measures.  We find that the prevalence of zombies lowers productivity. 
   In section 5 we analyze firm-level data to directly look for congestion effects of 
the zombies on non-zombie firms’ behavior.  We find that investment and employment 
growth for healthy firms falls as the percentage of zombies in their industry rises.   
                                                 
5 It is important to clarify at the outset that the zombie mechanism complements (rather than substitutes for)  
standard financial constraint mechanisms. As stated in the main text, an increase in the number of zombies 
reduces the collateral value of good firms in the industry, and hence tightens any financial constraints.   5
Moreover, the gap in productivity between zombie and non-zombie firms rises as the 
percentage of zombies rises.  All of these findings are consistent with the predictions that 
zombies crowd the market and that the congestion has real effects on the healthy firms in 
the economy.  Simple extrapolations using our regression coefficients suggest that 
cumulative size of the distortions (in terms of investment, or employment) is substantial.   
For instance, compared with the hypothetical case where the prevalence of zombies in the 
1990s remained at the historical average instead of rising, we find the investment was 
depressed between four and 36 percent per year (depending on the industry considered).   
  In the final section of the paper we conclude by summarizing our results and 
describing their implications.   
 
2. Identifying zombies 
 
  Our story can be divided into two parts.  First, the banks misallocated credit by 
supporting zombie firms.  Second, the existence of zombie firms interfered with the 
process of creative destruction and stifled growth.  Our measure of zombie should not 
only capture the misallocation of credit but also be useful in testing the effect of zombies 
on corporate profitability and growth. 
 
2.1 Defining Zombies 
There is a growing literature examining the potential misallocation of bank credit 
in Japan (see Sekine, Kobayashi, and Saita (2003) for a survey).   Much of the evidence is 
indirect.  For instance, several papers (including Hoshi (2000), Fukao (2000), Hosono 
and Sakuragawa (2003), Sasaki (2004)) study the distribution of loans across industries 
and note that underperforming industries like real estate or construction received more 
bank credit than other sectors that were performing better (such as manufacturing).
6   
                                                 
6 Other indirect evidence comes from studies such as Smith (2003), Schaede (2005) and Jerram (2004) that 
document that loan rates in Japan do not appear to be high enough to reflect the riskiness of the loans.   
Sakai, Uesugi and Watanabe (2005), however, show that poorly performing firms (measured by operating 
profits or net worth) still pay higher bank loan rates and are more likely to exit compared with better 
performing firms, at least for small firms.  Finally, see also Hamao, Mei and Xu  (forthcoming) who show 
that firm-level equity returns became less volatile during the 1990s and argue that this is likely due to a lack 
of restructuring in the economy.   6
  Peek and Rosengren (2005) offer the most direct and systematic study to date on 
the potential misallocation of bank credit.  They find that bank credit to poor performing 
firms often increased between 1993 and 1999.  During poor performance periods, these 
firms’ main banks are more likely to lend to them than other banks.  This pattern of 
perverse credit allocation is more likely when the bank’s own balance sheet is weak or 
when the borrower is a keiretsu affiliate.  Importantly, non-affiliated banks do not show 
this pattern.    
  We depart from past studies by classifying firms as zombies only based on our 
assessment of whether they are receiving subsidized credit, and not by looking at their 
productivity or profitability.  This strategy permits us to evaluate the effect of zombies on 
the economy.  If instead we were to define zombies based on their operating 
characteristics, then almost by definition industries dominated by zombie firms would 
have low profitability, and likely also have low growth.  Rather than hard-wiring this 
correlation, we want to test for it.     
  The challenge for our approach is to use publicly available information to 
determine which firms are receiving subsidized credit: banks and their borrowers have 
little incentive to reveal that a loan is miss-priced.  Because of the myriad of ways in 
which banks could transfer resources to their clients, there are many ways that we could 
attempt to measure subsidies.  To get some guidance we used the Nikkei Telecom 21 to 
search the four newspapers published by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun-sha (Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, Nikkei Kin’yū Shimbun, Nikkei Sangyō Shimbun, Nikkei Ryūtsū Shimbun) 
between January 1990 and May 2004 for all news articles containing the words “financial 
assistance” and either “management reconstruction plan” or (“corporation” and 
“reconstruction”).
7  The summary of our findings are given in Table 1.  
   Our search uncovers 120 separate cases.  In most of them there were multiple 
types of assistance that were included.   As the table shows, between interest rate 
concessions, debt-equity swaps, debt forgiveness, and moratoriums on loan principal or 
                                                 
7 The Japanese phrases were Kin’yu Shien AND (Keiei Saiken Keikaku OR (Kigyo AND Saiken)). 
   7
interest, most of these packages involve reductions in interest payments or outright debt 
forgiveness by the troubled firms.
8      
 The decision by a bank to restructure the loans to distressed companies in these 
ways, rather than just rolling over the loans, helps reduce the required capital needed by 
the bank.  Without such restructuring, banks would be forced to classify the loans to 
those borrowers as “at risk”, which usually would require the banks to set aside 70% of 
the loan value as loan loss reserves.  With restructuring, the banks need only move the 
loans to the “special attention” category, which requires reserves of at most 15%. 
In light of the evidence in Table 1, we concentrate on credit assistance that 
involves a direct interest rate subsidy.  We proceed in three steps.  First, we calculate a 
hypothetical lower bound for interest payments (R
*) that we expect only for the highest 
quality borrowers.  We then compare this lower bound to the observed interest payments.  
Finally, we make several econometric assumptions to use the observed difference 
between actual interest rate (r) and notional lower bound rate (r
*) to infer cases where we 
believe subsidies are present.  
    
2.2 Detecting Zombies 
 






where  , it BS ,  , it BL and  , it Bonds  are short-term bank loans (less than one year), long-term 
bank loans (more than one year), and total bonds outstanding (including convertible 
bonds (CBs) and warrant-attached bonds) respectively of firm i at the end of year t, and 
t rs ,   t rl , and rcbmin over the last 5 years, t are the average short-term prime rate in year t, the 
                                                 
8 These patterns are consistent with the claim by Tett and Ibison (2001) that almost one-half of the public 
funds injected into the banking system in 1998 and 1999 were allowed to be passed on to troubled 
construction companies in the form of debt forgiveness. 
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average long-term prime rate in year t, and the minimum observed coupon rate on any 
convertible corporate bond issued in the last five years before t. 
  This estimate for the lower bound reflects the data constraints we face.  In 
particular, all we know about the firms’ debt structure is the type of debt instrument 
(short-term bank borrowing, long-term borrowing that are due in one year and remaining 
long-term bank borrowing, bonds outstanding that are due in one year and remaining 
bonds outstanding, and commercial paper outstanding).  In other words, we do not know 
the exact interest rates on specific loans, bonds or commercial paper, nor do we know the 
exact maturities of any of these obligations.  Finally, the interest payments we can 
measure include all interest, fee and discount expenses, including those related to trade 
credit. 
  The general principle guiding the choices we make is to select interest rates that 
are extremely advantageous for the borrower, so that R* is in fact less than what most 
firms would pay in the absence of subsidies.  For instance, by assuming that bond 
financing takes place at rcbmin over the last 5 years, t  we are assuming not only that firms 
borrow using convertible bonds (which carry lower interest rates due to the conversion 
option), but also that these bonds are issued when rates are at their lowest.   We provide 
additional discussion of the data choices used in constructing R* and the alternative 
approaches that we examined for robustness check in Appendix 1.   
  To categorize firms we compare the actual interest payments made by the firms 
(Ri,t) with our hypothetical lower bound.  We normalize the difference by the amount of 
total borrowing at the beginning of the period (Bi.t-1 =  ,1 it BS − + ,1 it BL − +  ,1 it Bonds − +CPi,t-1), 
where  CPi,t-1 is the amount of commercial paper outstanding for the firm i at the 
beginning of the period t, so that the units are comparable to interest rates.  Accordingly 
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it it x rr ≡ =−, as the interest rate gap.  This 
measure is “conservative” because we assume the minimum interest rates that are 
extremely advantageous to the firm and because the interest payment, Ri,t, includes   
interest expenses on items beyond our concept of total borrowing (such as interest 
expenses on trade credit).   9
  Given our procedure to construct r* we will not be able to detect all types of 
subsidized lending.
9  In particular, any type of assistance that lowers the current period’s 
interest payments can be detected: including debt forgiveness, interest rate concessions, 
debt for equity swaps, or moratoriums on interest rate payments, all of which appeared to 
be prevalent in the cases studied in Table 1.  On the other hand, if a bank makes new 
loans to a firm at normal interest rates that are then used to pay off past loans, then our 
gap variable will not capture the subsidy.  Likewise, if a bank buys other assets from a 
client at overly generous prices our proxy will not detect the assistance.  
  We explore two strategies for identifying the set of zombie firms from the 
calculated interest rate gaps.  Our baseline procedure classifies a firm i as a zombie for 
year t whenever its interest rate gap is negative (xit < 0).   The justification for this 
strategy is the conservative philosophy underlying the construction of r*.  If r* is a 
perfectly measured lower bound, then only a firm that receives a subsidy can have a 
negative gap.  However, the problem of labeling a firm with xit just above zero as non-
zombie remains even under this perfect scenario. 
  Thus we resort to a second approach, which is more robust to misclassification of 
non-zombies. In this second approach we assume that the set of zombies is a “fuzzy” set.  
In the classical set theory, an element either belongs or does not belong to a particular set 
so that a 0-1 indicator function can be used to define a subset.  In contrast, in fuzzy set 
theory an element can belong to a particular subset to a certain degree, so that the 
indicator function can take any value in the interval [0, 1].   When the images of the 
indicator function are confined to {0, 1}, a set defined by the indicator function is called 
a “crisp” set.  Using this terminology, our first approach assumes the set of zombies is 
“crisp.”  Our second approach, on the other hand, assumes the set is “fuzzy,” allowing 
some firms to be more-or-less zombie-like.
10 
  The indicator function that defines a fuzzy subset is called “membership 
function,” which we assume to be (for the set of zombie firms): 
                                                 
9 In addition to the cases studied below, Hoshi (2006) examines the potential problems that might arise 
from rapid changes in interest rates.  For example, if interest rates fell sharply and actual loan terms moved 
as well, then our gap variable could be misleading about the prevalence of subsidized loans.  He constructs 
an alternative measure (that would be more robust to within year interest rate changes) and concludes that 
this sort of problem does not appear to be quantitatively important.  
10 See Nguyen and Walker (2006) for an introduction to the fuzzy set theory.   10
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The shape of the membership function is determined by the two parameters, d1 and d2.  
Figure 2 shows this membership function along with the indicator function implicit in our 
first approach.  It is easy to see the second approach degenerates to our first approach 
when d1 and d2 are both zero. 
  The second approach is appealing given the fuzzy nature of the concept of 
“zombie firms.”  These are defined to be those firms that receive sufficient financial help 
from their creditors to survive in spite of their poor profitability.  It is inherently difficult 
to specify how much financial help is considered to be sufficient, even if we had access 
to much more information than we do about individual firms. Our fuzzy approach 
acknowledges this limitation and assigns numbers between 0 and 1 to those firms whose 
zombie status is ambiguous. 
  Given the asymmetry (toward conservatism) inherent in the construction of r*, we 
assume that d1 is closer to zero than d2.  In what follows we show results for (d1, d2) = (0, 
50bp) and (d1, d2) = (-25bp, 75bp), where bp stands for basis points.  Thus, in the first 
case, we assume a firm with xit below zero is a definite zombie and a firm with xit above 
50 basis points is definitely a non-zombie: any firm with xit between zero and 50 basis 
points has “zombiness” between 0 and 1.   
 
 
2.3 Quantifying the prevalence of zombies  
  
  Figure 1 showed the aggregate estimate of the percentage of zombies using our 
baseline procedure.  As mentioned earlier, treating all firms equally we see that the 
percentage of zombies hovered between 5 and 15 percent up until 1993 and then rose 
sharply over the mid 1990s so that the zombie percentage was above 25 percent for every 
year after 1994.  In terms of congestion spillovers, a size weighted measure of zombies is 
likely to be more important.   Weighting firms by their assets we see the same general   11
pattern but with the overall percentage being lower, closer to 15 percent in the latter part 
of the sample.   
  We view the cross-sectional prevalence of zombies as another way to assess the 
plausibility of our definition.  To conduct this assessment, we aggregated the data used in 
Figure 1 into five industry groups covering manufacturing, construction, real estate, retail 
and wholesale (other than the nine largest general trading companies), and services – 
recall that all the firms included here are publicly traded. The zombie index for an 
industry is constructed by calculating the share of total assets held by the zombie firms – 
and for the remainder of the paper we concentrate on asset weighted zombie indices.  In 
addition to showing the industry distribution, we also compute the zombie percentages 
implied by our second procedure with (d1, d2) = (0, 50bp) and (d1, d2) = (-25bp, 75bp).   
Figure 3 shows the zombie index for each industry from 1981 to 2002.  We draw 
three main conclusions from these graphs.  Starting with the upper left hand panel that 
shows the data for the entire sample, first notice that the crisp zombie measure (our 
baseline case) and the two fuzzy measures share similar time series movements (with the 
correlation between the crisp measure and the two fuzzy measures exceeding 0.99). 
Second, the other five panels show that the proportion of zombie firms increased in the 
late 1990s in every industry.  The third key conclusion is that the zombie problem was 
more serious for non-manufacturing firms than for manufacturing firms.  In 
manufacturing, the crisp measure suggests that zombie index only rose from 3.11% 
(1981-1993 average) to 9.58% (1996-2002 average).  In the construction industry, 
however, the measure increased from 4.47% (1981-1993 average) to 20.35% (1996-2002 
average).  Similar large increases occurred for the wholesale and retail, services, and real 
estate industries.  
There are a variety of potential explanations for these cross-sectional differences.  
For instance, Japanese manufacturing firms face global competition and thus could not be 
protected easily without prohibitively large subsidies.  For example, many of the troubled 
Japanese automakers were taken over by foreign firms rather than rescued by their banks 
during the 1990s.  In contrast, there is very little foreign competition in the other four 
industries.    12
A second important factor was the nature of the shocks hitting the different 
sectors.  For instance, the construction and real estate industries were forced to deal with 
the huge run-up and subsequent collapse of land prices mentioned earlier.  Thus, the 
adjustment for these industries was likely to be more wrenching than for the other sectors. 
But the most important point about the differences shown in Figure 3 is that they 
confirm the conventional wisdom that bank lending distortions were not equal across 
sectors and that the problems were less acute in manufacturing – see Sekine et al (2003) 
for further discussion.  Thus, regardless of which explanation one favors as to why this 
might be the case, we view it as particularly reassuring that our zombie index confirms 
this conventional view. 
  Figure 4, our last plausibility check, shows the asset weighted percentages of 
zombies for the firms that are above and below the median profit rate for their industry. 
To keep the graphs readable we show only the crisp measures, but the other measures 
show similar patterns.   In manufacturing the differences are not very noticeable, with 
slightly fewer high profit firms being labeled as zombies.  In the remaining industries, 
particularly in real estate and construction, it appears that our measure of zombies is 
identifying firms that are systematically less profitable than the non-zombies, particularly 
from the mid-1990s onward.   
 
2.4. Potential Classification Errors 
 
 
Our classification scheme of zombies is admittedly imperfect, so we also consider 
a number of alternative schemes.  The goal in exploring these alternatives is to assess the 
effect of misclassifying a zombie firm as a non-zombie (a type I error) or misclassifying a 
healthy firm as a zombie (a type II error).  Most of the alternatives reduce one type of 
error by increasing the other type of error.  Thus,  we do not expect the results from these 
experiments to be identical.  Instead, we looked primarily at whether the time series 
pattern and cross-sectional patterns were similar to the ones presented in the last section. 
We also re–estimate our basic regressions using these alternative zombie measures 
instead of our standard measures.  The results for the baseline definitions and the   13
alternatives are generally quite similar, and in the remainder of this section we briefly 
describe the properties of the alternatives.   
  One possible problem is that some good firms are mistakenly dubbed zombies 
because they can borrow at interest rates lower than the prime rates.  Alternatively, if a 
good firm pays off its bank loans during an accounting year, we may find its interest 
payment for the accounting year too small given the amount of bank loans at the 
beginning of the period and classify the firm as a zombie.
11    
  To gauge the extent of these problems we modified our baseline definitions in two 
ways (both of which will reduce our estimates of the zombie prevalence).   In one version, 
we automatically classified any firms with quality corporate bonds as non-zombies.  This 
makes sense if we believe buyers of bonds will not subsidize firms and hence access to 
the bond market would dry up for failing firms.  We considered two thresholds: bonds 
rated A or above, or those rated BBB or above, the latter being the cutoff for a bond to be 
considered investment grade.
12   
We also modified the definition to use data from either two or three years to 
determine a firm’s zombie status; in these alternatives, we average the value of the 
zombie indicators across either two or three years.   By taking only the firms that have 
persistently low funding costs we are much more likely to avoid incorrectly labeling a 
non-zombie as a zombie.  However, given the nature of the lower bound interest rate used 
in our calculation, this averaging would be extremely conservative and hence much more 
likely to characterize zombies as non-zombies.
13   
  To explore the potential impact of these type I errors, we reverse the preceding 
logic and count firms as zombies based on the maximum zombie indicator over either the 
                                                 
11 To see how often clearly healthy firms are mis-classified as zombies by our crisp definition, Hoshi 
(2006) examined the firms that had R&I bond rating of AA or above as of November 2004 and are included 
in our sample.  In only one occasion for one out of these 26 firms for five years (1997 to 2001), our zombie 
index misclassified the firm as a zombie.  From this, he concludes the type II error is not a serious problem. 
12 We use the Ratings by R&I and its predecessors.  We thank Yasuhiro Harada and Akio Ihara of R&I for 
providing us with the data.  When both the firm itself and the bonds that the firm issued are rated, we use 
the rating for the firm.  When the rating for the firm itself is not available and when multiple bonds are 
rated, we use the most recent rating announcement (newly rated, changed, or maintained). 
13 If we go all the way to forcing the firms to be obvious zombies in multiple consecutive years the 
percentages of zombies drops sharply.  For instance, using the crisp definition, the percentage of assets in 
zombies firms is 14.96% in 2002.  If we consider only firms that are zombies in two (three) consecutive 
years, the percentage drops to 10.83% (8.74%).    14
last two or three years.
14  For example, with the three year window, we define a new crisp 
set of zombies that include all firms for which the crisp indicator identifies a firm as a 
zombie in the current year or either of the last two years.  Naturally, these corrections 
raise the estimated prevalence of zombies.   
  Collectively these experiments yield 18 alternative indices (the three baseline 
definitions, interacted with two different bond rating thresholds, two time averaging 
schemes, and two maximum time horizons).   Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of 
the various definitions.   The second column shows the correlations between the different 
measures and the crisp index (Z1), while the next column reports the asset weighted 
percentage of zombies in the last year of the sample (2002).  We report the latter data 
because having inspected versions of Figure 3 for the various definitions, this is a 
convenient way to summarize the quantitative differences across them.  
We read these two columns as suggesting two main conclusions.  First, the crisp 
measure is highly correlated with all other measures.  Second, the quantitative 
significance of the alternatives on the estimated level of zombie prevalence is fairly 
modest.  For instance, the estimates for the conservative alternatives based on the crisp 
zombie definition (ZA01 to ZA04) in 2002 range from 10.65% to 14.14%, while Z01 is 
14.96%.  The estimates for the alternatives based on fuzzy zombies (ZA05 to ZA12) 
range between 17.09% and 22.17%, while Z02 and Z03 are 21.40% and 22.42%, 
respectively.        
The remaining columns in the table show correlations between the crisp measure 
for different industries and the alternative estimates.  Given the predominance of 
manufacturing firms in the sample it is not surprising that the results for that industry 
mimic the full sample patterns.  The alternatives are also quite similar for construction, 
trade and services, and there is no reason why this needs to be the case.    
The variation across the zombie definitions for the real state sector is somewhat 
larger.  This partially reflects the fact that there were not many real estate firms in the 
sample (fewer than 40 in the early 1980s and no more than 60 during the 1990s).  Indeed, 
                                                 
14 Hoshi (2006) examines prevalence of type I error by looking at how our zombie measure classifies well 
known troubled firms in Japan.  He finds that our measure often fails to identify the firms in the list of 
highly indebted and troubled firms published in Kin’yu Business (December 2001) as zombies.  Thus, he 
concludes the type I error is potentially a problem.   15
looking back at Figure 3 it was already apparent that the fuzzy and crisp definitions gave 
somewhat different pictures of the 1980s.  This is because the movement of only a few 
firms could change the percentages appreciably. Fortunately given the small size of this 
sector relative to the other four (less than 5% of total sample assets reside in this sector), 





3. A simple model of the effect of zombie firms on restructuring 
 
  To analyze the effect of zombies we study a simple environment that involves 
entry and exit decisions of single-unit incumbent firms and potential new firms.  After 
exploring this case we consider a richer version of the model that describes expansion 
and contraction decisions of existing multi-unit firms. As a benchmark we first model all 
decisions being governed purely by the operating profits from running a firm.  We then 
contrast that environment to one where some incumbent firms (for an unspecified reason) 




3.1 The Environment 
 
  The essential points of interest can be seen in a model where time is discrete and 
indexed by t . A representative period t  starts with a mass  t m  of existing production 
units.  The productivity of the incumbents varies over time and the current level of 
productivity for firm i in year t, 
o
it Y , is: 
 
ε ε =+ + = + + (1 )
oo o
t it t t t it it YA A B A A B , 
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where  t A  represents the state of technology shared by all the incumbent production units 
at time t, B is a potential shift parameter that can represent an aggregate productivity 
shock, and ε
o
it is an idiosyncratic shock that is distributed uniformly on the unit interval.  
The state of technology is assumed to improve over time so that At+1 > At.   The main 
predictions from this model do not depend on the persistence of idiosyncratic 
productivity shocks, so we assume they are independently and identically distributed.  
  In addition to the incumbents, there is also a set of potential entrants, and we 
normalize their mass to be ½.  Each potential entrant draws a productivity level,
n
it Y , 
before deciding whether to enter or not.  We assume that potential entrants have 
technological advantage over incumbents, so that the productivity for a potential new 
firm is consistently higher than incumbents by γAt.  Thus, 
 
γ εγ ε =+ ++ =+ + + (1 ) (1 )
nn n




it  distributed uniformly on the unit interval. The shock ε
n
it is again assumed to have 
no persistence.  The stochastic process for aggregate technology left unspecified, except 
for the assumption that it grows by more than the advantage of the new firms, so that 
At+1>(1+γ)At.  We also assume that there is an entry cost that is proportional to the state 
of technology, κ > 0 t A , that the new entrants must pay to start up.  
Finally, both new and old units must incur a cost  () tt ApN  in order to produce, 
where  t N  represents the number of production units in operation at time t , i.e., the sum 
of remaining incumbents and new entrants. The function  () pN  is increasing with respect 
to N, and captures any reduction in profits due to congestion or competition.
15  For our 
purposes, all the predictions we emphasize will hold as long as  () pN is a strictly 
increasing continuous function of N.  For simplicity, we adopt the linear function: 
 
                                                 
15 For example, we can motivate p(N) as the reduction in profits due to competition in the output market.  
Suppose the price of output is given by D
-1(N), a decreasing function of N, and that the cost of production 
for each production unit is just proportional to the state of technology, AC.  Under our assumption on  
productivity, an incumbent decides to stay in the market (and a potential entrant decides to enter the 
market) if D
-1(N)A(1+B+ε)-AC > 0, or equivalently, 1+B+ε-C/ D
-1(N) > 0.  In this specific 
example, p(N) is C/ D
-1(N), which is increasing with respect to N.   17
μ =+ () . tt pN N  
 
where the intercept μ captures cost changes and other profit shocks. 
  In analyzing this model, it is useful to normalize productivity by the state of 
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3.2  Decisions  
 
  This basic model will quickly generate complicated dynamics because the 
existing firms have paid the entry cost and thus face a different decision problem than the 
new firms for which the entry cost is not sunk.  These dynamics are not essential for our 
main predictions, thus we assume that γ κ = .  In this case, the exit decision by 
incumbents and the entry decision by potential entrants become fully myopic. Since 
productivity shocks are i.i.d. and there is no advantage from being an insider (the sunk 
cost of investment is exactly offset by a lower productivity), both types of units look only 
at current profits to decide whether to operate. 
Letting 
o y  and 
n y  denote the reservation productivity (normalized by the state of 
technology) of incumbents and potential entrants, respectively, we have:  
 
−= () 0 ,
o yp N  
 
κ −− = () 0 .
n yp N  
 
In this case it is straightforward to find the mass of exit, t D , and entry,  t H , 
respectively:   18
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Adding units created to the surviving incumbents yields the total number of units 
operating at timet :  
 
() () ⎛⎞ =+−=+ − − − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
1
1( ) 1 .
2
ttt t t t NHmD m p N B     (6) 
 
3.3 Equilibrium and Steady State 
 
We can now solve for the steady state of the normal version of the economy. The first 
step is to replace  μ + ()  w i t h   pN N  in (6). The notation is simplified if we define S to be 
composite shock that is equal to 1+B-μ . Note that a lower S indicates either higher costs 
(higher μ) or lower productivity for both incumbents and potential entrants (smaller B).  
We can now find the equilibrium number of units:  
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Given the total number of operating units, we can solve for equilibrium rates of 
destruction and creation by substituting (7) into (4) and (5):  
⎛⎞ +−
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The dynamics of this system are determined by: 
 
+ = 1 . tt mN        ( 1 0 )  
 
In steady state, the mass of incumbents remains constant at  =
ss ss mN , which 
requires that creation and destruction exactly offset each other or, equivalently, that 
= tt mN . Using the latter condition and (7), yields a quadratic equation for 
ss m , which 
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In our subsequent analysis we will assume that the economy begins in a steady 
state and that the initial (pre-shock) value of S, S0, is 0. Given this normalization, the 
corresponding steady state will be  = = 00 1/2 mN and  = = 00 1/4. HD  
 
3.4 A (permanent) Recession 
 
  We can now analyze the adjustment of the economy to a profit shock.  By 
construction the model treats aggregate productivity shifts, changes in A, and cost shocks, 
changes in μ, as equivalent.  Thus, what follows does not depend on which of these 
occurs.  We separate the discussion to distinguish between the short- and long-run impact 
of a decline in S from  01 0 to  0 SS =< . By the “short-run” we mean for a fixed m = m0 = 
1/2. By the “long-run,” on the other hand, we mean after m has adjusted to its new steady 
state value  =+ 11 1/2 (2/3) mS .   20
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That is, when S drops, creation falls and destruction rises, leading to a decline in N.  In 
other words, in a normal economy, a negative profit shock is met with both increased exit 
by incumbents and reduced entry of new firms. 
Over time, the gap between destruction and creation reduces the number of 
incumbents (recall from (6) and (10) that ΔN=H-D), which lowers the cost (p(N)) and 
eventually puts an end to the gap between creation and destruction caused by the negative 
shock.  











The number of production units falls beyond the initial impact as time goes by and the 
positive gap between destruction and creation closes gradually. Note that because N falls 
less than one for one with S, the long run reduction in the cost due to reduced congestion 
is not enough to offset the direct effect of a lower S on creation. That is, creation falls in 
the long run.   And since creation and destruction are equal in the long run, the initial 
surge in destruction is temporary and ultimately destruction also ends up falling below its 
pre-shock level.
16  
                                                 
16 This long run level effect is undone when creation and destruction are measured as ratios over N, as is 




Suppose now that “banks” choose to protect incumbents from the initial surge in 
destruction brought about by the decline in S.  There are a variety of ways that this might 
be accomplished. We assume that the banks do this by providing just enough resources to 
the additional units that would have been scrapped so that they can remain in operation.  
With this assumption, a firm that does receive a subsidy is indifferent to exiting and 
operating, and thus entry and exit decisions remain myopic. 






z DD  
 
The post-shock destruction remains the same as the pre-shock level.  The lack of 
adjustment on the destruction margin means that now creation must do all the adjustment.  
Thus, the following two equations, derived from (5) and (6), determine the post-shock 
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Solving these:  
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empirically the flows are divided by either initial employment or a weighted average of initial and final 
employment. 
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Differentiating (14) with respect to S, and compare the result to the short-run change in 












Indeed, it is easy to see the expression (12) is less than 1/3 for any positive m0.  That is, a 
decline in S always has a much larger negative effect on creation in the presence of 
zombies.  This result is a robust feature of this type of model.  In particular, the same 
qualitative prediction would hold even if we had not suppressed the dynamics and had 
allowed persistence in the productivity shocks and a gap between entry costs and the 
productivity advantage of new firms.  Intuitively, this is the case because the adverse 
shock requires the labor market to clear with fewer people employed.  If destruction is 
suppressed, then the labor market clearing can only occur if job creation drops 
precipitously.  
As Caballero and Hammour (1998, 2000) emphasize, both this “sclerosis” — the 
preservation of production units that would not be saved without the banks’ subsidies— 
and the associated “scrambling” — the retention of firms that are less productive than 
some of those that do not enter due to the congestion caused by the zombies – are robust 
implications of models of creative destruction when there are frictions against destruction. 
Compared with a normally functioning economy, we have shown the existence of 
zombies softens a negative shock’s impact on destruction and exacerbates its impact on 













That is, in response to a negative shock, N falls by less if there are zombies, which means 
that in the presence of zombies the reduced destruction is not fully matched by the 
additional drop in creation.  It is easy to see that the expression (13) is greater than 1/3 for   23
any positive m0.  This is another intuitive and robust result.  This occurs because as job 
creation falls, the marginal entrant’s productivity rises. This high productivity allows the 
marginal entrant to operate despite the higher cost induced by (comparatively) larger N.   
A final important prediction of the model is the existence of a gap in profitability 
(net of entry costs) between the marginal entrant and the marginal incumbent when there 
are zombies.
17 At impact, the destruction does not change, so that all the firms with 
idiosyncratic productivity shocks above the old threshold (1/2) remain in the industry.  
On the other hand, new entrants have to clear a higher threshold to compensate for the 
negative shock in S (which is only partially offset by the lower congestion following the 
negative shock).  As a result, the profitability of the marginal entrant is inefficiently 
higher than that of the marginal incumbent. The difference (normalized by the existing 
state of technology) is given by: 
 






In summary, the model makes two robust predictions.  The first is that the 
presence of zombies distorts the normal creation and destruction patterns to force larger 
creation adjustments following shocks to costs, productivity or profits.  Second, this 
distortion depresses productivity by preserving inefficient units at the expense of more 
productive potential entrants.   Accordingly, productivity will be lower when there are 
more zombies and as the zombies become more prevalent they will generate larger and 
larger distortions for the non-zombies.   
Finally, note that for simplicity we have illustrated the main effects of zombies in 
the case of a permanent recession. However these effects carry over to temporary 
recessions as well. The main mechanism through which zombies hurt creation and 
productivity is through congestion. It is apparent that if the recession were to end, then 
the presence of congesting zombies would yield a recovery that is less vigorous in terms 
                                                 
17 Note that a wedge like this one also arises when there is a credit constraint on potential entrants but not 
on incumbents. In our model depressed entry results from the congestion due to zombies, and the gap is due 
to the subsidy to incumbents. Clearly, however, if the two mechanisms coexist they would reinforce each 
other, as congestion would reduce the collateral value of potential entrants.    24
of creation and productivity growth. This weak recovery aspect is also a fairly general 
implication of models of creation destruction with frictions in destruction.
18   
 
3.6. A Firm as a Collection of Projects 
 
  By re-interpreting a “production unit” in the model to be a “project” and defining 
a “firm” as an entity that has many such projects (both existing and potential), we can use 
the model to discuss expansions and contractions of large firms.  This extension brings 
the theoretical discussion closer to our empirical analysis in later sections. 
  Let us assume that the industry has a fixed number of firms, which is normalized 
to be one.  Each firm has a mass mkt of incumbent projects, whose productivity 
(normalized by the existing state of technology) is given by (2).  Each firm has a mass 1/2 
of potential new projects, whose productivity (normalized by the state of technology) is 
given by (3).  Each project is hit by an idiosyncratic shock every period, so each firm 
decides which incumbent projects to terminate and which new projects to start. 
  A zombie firm is defined to be a firm that does not adjust the project selection 
rules when a (negative) shock hits the industry, consistent with the discussion above.  A 
non-zombie firm adjusts the project selection rules following the shock.  The operating 
cost (normalized by the state of technology) of the firm is assumed is, as before, a 
function of the total amount of projects operated by all the firms in the industry at time t, 
Nt.  Letting λ be the proportion of non-zombie firms in the industry and assuming all 
zombies (and non-zombies) are homogeneous within the group in terms of the 
distribution of potential projects they can take, the total number of projects actually taken 




tt t NN N λλ =+ −,       ( 1 6 )  
 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Caballero (2007). 
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where 
z
t N is the total number of projects operated by a (representative) zombie firm and 
nz
t N  is the total number of projects operated by a (representative) non-zombie firm. 
  Assuming the same linear functional form for p(N) and the same notation for the 
shock S as in the previous sections, a non-zombie firm starts all the new projects with  
idiosyncratic productivity shock greater than N-S and terminates all the incumbent 
projects with idiosyncratic productivity shock less than N-S.  Thus, destruction (the 
number of incumbent projects terminated) by non-zombies, denoted by 
nz








t m  is the number of incumbent projects for a non-zombie at the beginning of 
period t.  Similarly, creation (the number of new projects implemented) by non-zombies, 
denoted by 
nz
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The total number of projects taken by non-zombie firms in period t is: 
 
nz nz nz nz
tttt NmHD =+−       ( 1 9 )  
 
  Solving the equations (16) through (19) for a given 
z
t N , which by assumption is 
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By differentiating (20), (21), and (22), it is straightforward to see: 
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Thus, following a negative profitability shock, non-zombie firms increase destruction, 
reduce creation, and contract.  Moreover, the size of these adjustments is increasing in the 
number of zombies in the industry.  This can be shown by differentiating the derivatives 
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Having more zombies in the industry (smaller λ) increases the amount of adjustment 
induced by a negative shock (negative S). 
  We can also study the productivity implications for non-zombies.   The 
productivity (normalized by the state of technology) of the marginal incumbent project 
kept by non-zombie firms is  t NS − .  Similarly, the productivity of the marginal new 
project chosen by non-zombies is  t NS γ + − .  Thus, under the assumption of a uniform   27
distribution of idiosyncratic shock for projects, the average productivity of a non-zombie 
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Substituting (16), (20), and (22) into (24), yields: 
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Immediately after a negative profitability shock hits the industry, the second term of this 
expression is zero, so that the average productivity of a non-zombie unambiguously goes 
up. 
  Over time, a negative shock reduces the number of incumbent projects and  
gradually increases the proportion of new (and more productive) projects relative to 





















Moreover, it is clear that both (negative) terms in (25) are increasing in λ.  Thus, when 
there are more zombies in the industry (smaller λ), the size of the productivity gap 
increases.   28
  From this analysis we conclude that allowing for multi-project firms does not 
change the baseline predictions regarding creation, destruction or productivity.  We 
explored further extensions of the model that allowed for heterogeneity in the 
productivity levels but found that there were no robust predictions about how 
heterogeneity might alter these predictions.  In particular, if we model heterogeneity as a 
firm specific factor that affects the level of productivity (i.e. adding a firm-specific 
constant to equations (2) and (3)), then there are no changes to our main predictions 
regarding the effects of increased zombie prevalence.  
 
4.  The effect of zombies on job creation, destruction and productivity 
 
  We use the two robust predictions of the model to guide our search for evidence 
that the zombie problem has affected Japan’s economic performance significantly. We 
begin by looking at aggregate cross-industry differences.  In the next section, we study 
firm-level data to characterize how the behavior of the non-zombie firms has been altered 
by the presence of zombie competitors. 
  Because our zombie indices exist from 1981 onwards, we start by calculating the 
average of the crisp zombie index for each industry from then until 1993 and compare 
that to the average for the late 1990s (1996-2002).  We use the differences in these two 
averages to correct for possible biases in the level of zombie index and any industry-
specific effects. It makes little difference as to how we define the pre-zombie period. In 
particular, the results we show would be very similar if we took the normal (non-zombie) 
period to be 1981 to 1990, or 1990 to 1993. Our evidence consists of relating creation, 
destruction, and productivity data to this change in the zombie index, in order to see if 
these measures are more distorted in the industries where zombie prevalence has 
increased the most.  
  Our most direct evidence on this point is in Figure 5, which plots the rate of job 
creation and destruction against the change in the zombie index.  We use the job flow 
measures constructed by Genda et al. (2003) as proxies for the concepts of entry and exit 
in our model.  Their measures are based on The Survey of Employment Trends, 
conducted by the Ministry of Welfare and Labor biannually on a large sample of   29
establishments that employ five or more regular workers.  The series used for our 
analysis include not only the job creation (destruction) at the establishments that were 
included in the survey in both at the beginning and at the end of the year, but also the 
estimated job creation (and destruction) by new entrants (and the establishments that 
exited).  To control for the industry specific effects in job creation/destruction, we look at 
the difference between the average job creation (destruction) rate for the 1996-2000 
period and the average for the 1991-1993 period.  We are restricted to using the 1991—
93 data as a control because figures of Genda et al. start only in 1991 and we stop in 2000 
because that is the last year they cover. 
  The top of Figure 5 shows that the job destruction rate in the late 1990s increased 
from that in the early 1990s in every industry, as we would expect to see following an 
unfavorable shock to the economy.
19  More importantly, the graph shows that the surge in 
destruction was smaller in the industries where more zombies appeared.  Thus, as we 
expected, the presence of zombies slows down job destruction. 
  The second panel of Figure 5 shows that the presence of zombies depresses job 
creation.  Creation declined more in the industries that experienced sharper zombie 
growth.  In manufacturing, which suffered the least from the zombie problem, job 
creation hardly changed from the early 1990s to the late 1990s. In sharp contrast, job 
creation exhibits extensive declines in non-manufacturing sectors, particularly in the 
construction sector.   
  Of course not all sectors were equally affected by the Japanese crash in asset 
prices and the slowdown that followed it. For example, construction, having benefited 
disproportionately from the boom years, probably also was hit by the largest recessionary 
shock during the 1990s. A large shock naturally raises job destruction and depresses job 
creation further. Despite this source of (for us, unobserved) heterogeneity, the general 
patterns we expected from job flows hold.  One way of controlling for the size of the 
shock is by checking whether in more zombie-affected sectors, the relative adjustment 
through job creation is larger. In this metric, it is quite clear from Figure 5 that job 
                                                 
19 Our simple model assumes that the job destruction rate stays the same even after a negative shock in a 
zombie industry.  It is straightforward to relax this by assuming, for example, that 90% of zombies are 
rescued by banks.  None of the major results would change.  Job destruction would rise following a 
negative shock but not as much as it would under the normal environment.   30
creation has borne a much larger share of the adjustment in construction than in 
manufacturing.   
  Our evidence on productivity distortions caused by the interest rate subsidies is 
given in Figure 6.  In the model, zombies are the low productivity units that would exit 
the market in the absence of help from the banks. Their presence lowers the industry’s 
average productivity both directly by continuing to operate and indirectly by deterring 
entry of more productive firms.  The productivity data here are from Miyagawa, Ito and 
Harada (2004) who study productivity growth in 22 industries.  Figure 6, which plots the 
average growth of the total factor productivity (TFP) from 1990 to 2000 against the 
change in the crisp zombie index, shows that the data are consistent with the model’s 
implication: the regression line in the figure confirms the visual impression that industries 
where zombies became more important were the ones where TFP growth was worst.
20   
  As mentioned in the introduction to the paper, the role of zombie firms in 
depressing   productivity is a critical channel through which zombies can have longer-
lived aggregate affects.  One potential concern with the causal interpretation of Figure 6 
is that the zombie infestation was most pronounced outside of manufacturing and it is 
possible that the lagging productivity of these industries is just a normal cyclical 
phenomenon.  
  Figure 7 shows the (level of) TFP for the manufacturing sector and non-
manufacturing sector from 1980 through 2004.
21  The data are taken from the EU Klems 
project (http://www.euklems.net/) that is organized by the European Union and the 
OECD to permit comparisons of productivity and other economic outcomes across 
countries.  We form the non-manufacturing series by weighting the reported valued 
added TFP figures for Construction, Wholesale and Retail Trade, and Real Estate 
Activities by their value added shares.
22  The shaded areas of the graph show business 
cycle downturns, defined as the period between a peak and the next official business 
cycle trough (http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/stat/di/041112rdates.html). 
                                                 
20 Of course this correlation could arise because industries that had the worst shocks wound up with the 
most zombies.  We can disentangle these explanations by using firm-level data (see below).    
21 Prior to 1980 manufacturing productivity growth in Japan was exceptionally high (presumably due to the 
catching up of the Japanese economy).  Hence, comparisons of manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
productivity in the 1970s and 1960s are not informative about the issues that interest us.  
22 In the KLEMS spreadsheet these series are codes F,G, and 70.  The manufacturing series is code D.      31
  We draw two general conclusions from Figure 7.  First, as a rule productivity 
growth in the non-manufacturing sectors is lower than in manufacturing.  Second, during 
the second half of our sample from (1991 through 2002) productivity growth slowed in 
both manufacturing and non-manufacturing. The change is especially clear for recoveries 
(periods between a trough and the next peak) when the need for vigorous creation is 
depressed by the congestion caused by zombies: Productivity growth during the 
recoveries in the 1990s is much weaker than in the 1980s. 
More importantly for the zombie hypothesis is that the relative behavior of 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing also has shifted during the 1990s.  From the end of 
the deep 1982 recession until the onset of the recession in 1991, manufacturing and non-
manufacturing productivity growth differed by 1.5 percent per year.  The relative gap 
widened substantially through the 1990s; for instance, during just the recovery periods of 
1993-97 and 1999-2000, the gap was over 3.8 percentage points per year.  This gap 
pattern is consistent with the prevalence of zombies during the 1990s.  
 
5. Firm-level zombie distortions 
 
  We read the evidence in the last section as showing that zombies are distorting 
industry patterns of job creation and destruction, as well as productivity in the ways 
suggested by the model.  To test directly the model’s predictions, we next look at firm-
level data to see if the rising presence of zombies in the late 1990s had discernible effects 
on healthy firms (which would suffer from the congestion created by the zombies).   
  The data we analyze are from the Nikkei Needs Financial dataset and are derived 
from income statements and balance sheets for firms listed on the first and second 
sections of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  The sample runs from 1981 to 2002, and it 
contains between 1,844 and 2,506 firms depending on the year. We concentrate on three 
variables: employment growth (measured by the number of full-time employees), the 
investment rate (defined as the ratio of investment in depreciable assets to beginning of 
year depreciable assets measured at book value), and a crude productivity proxy 
(computed as the log of sales minus 1/3 the log of capital minus 2/3 the log of   32
employment).
23   In all the regressions reported below we dropped observations in the top 
and bottom 2.5% of the distribution of the dependent variable.  
  The simplest regression that we study is: 
 
ijt 1 t 2 j ijt jt ijt jt ijt Activity =   δ D+ δ D +  nonz  +   +  nonz *Z   +   Z β χϕ ε ′′    (26) 
 
where activity can be either the investment rate, the percentage change in employment, or 
our productivity proxy, Dt is a set of annual dummy variables, Dj is a set of industry 
dummy variables, nonzijt is the non-zombie dummy (defined to be one minus the zombie 
indicator), and Zjt is the percentage of industry assets residing in zombie firms.    
  Because of the reduced form nature of both the regression equation and the 
modeling of the subsidies to the zombies, we do not attempt to interpret most of the 
coefficients in these regressions.  For instance, we include the year dummies to allow for 
unspecified aggregate shocks.  Likewise, we can imagine that the zombies’ subsidies are 
so large that they wind up investing more (or adding more workers) than the healthy 
firms; so we do not propose to test the theory by looking at the estimates for β, the 
coefficient on the non-zombie dummy.  The one exception to this general principle is that 
for the productivity specification the model clearly predicts that non-zombies will have 
higher average productivity than zombies.     
  We instead focus on what we see as the novel prediction of the theory: that the 
rising zombie congestion should harm the non-zombies.  The prediction is most clearly 
shown in (23), which shows the effects when we define each firm as a collection of 
projects.  The cross-derivatives in (23) show that when there are more zombies in the 
industry, a negative shock leads to a larger  increase in destruction,  reduction in creation, 
and reduction in the total number of projects carried out by the non-zombies.  This 
prediction suggests that φ should be negative in the investment and employment 
regressions, and positive in the productivity specification.  
                                                 
23 In the model there is no distinction between capital and labor. As noted by an anonymous referee, if 
subsidized interest rates bias zombies toward capital-intensive technologies, then congestion could be more 
severe in the capital market than in the labor market. However, it is also possible that subsidized loans are 
only meant to finance working capital, in which case the bias goes the other way around. We have no way 
to distinguish between these possibilities in our data.   33
  The second through fourth columns of Table 3 shows our estimates for equation 
(26) for the crisp zombie index. We draw two main conclusions from this simple 
specification.   First, as predicted by the theory, increases in percentages of zombie firms 
operating in an industry significantly reduces both investment and employment growth 
for the healthy firms in the industry.
24  Second, looking at column 4, the productivity gap 
between zombies and non-zombies rises significantly as the percentage of zombies in an 
industry rises.  These findings are consistent with the main predictions of our model.   
Note that for the investment (employment) specification one might normally expect that 
as the percentage of sick firms in the industry rises, the healthy firms would have more 
(relative to the sick ones) to gain from investing (expanding employment).  Thus, under 
normal (non-zombie) circumstances there would be good reasons to expect φ to be 
positive rather than negative.   
  The main reason, other than ours, for finding a negative φ is if the zombie 
percentage in the industry (for that year) is somehow standing in for the overall 
(un)attractiveness of operating in the industry (for that year).  To this potential objection 
to our results we start by noting two things.  First, our definition of zombies, by virtue of 
only using interest rate payments, does not guarantee that growth opportunities are 
necessarily bad just because the zombie percentage is high. Second, in order to be 
consistent with our findings, the reaction to industry conditions must be different for 
zombies and non-zombies. In particular, non-zombies must be more affected by an 
industry downturn than zombies for φ to come out negative.   
  Nonetheless, we make several attempts to address this potential problem.  Our 
first alternative is to add industry-year dummies to equation (26), so that we estimate:
25   
  ijt 3 jt ijt ijt jt ijt Activity =   δ D +  nonz  +  nonz *Z   +  w βϕ ′    (27) 
This specification controls for all the factors that affect all the firms in an industry in a 
certain year.
26   Note that we cannot identify the coefficient on the industry zombie 
                                                 
24 We ran a similar regression using investment rates for US firms covered in the Compustat database 
between 1995 and 2004.  In this regression φ was insignificantly different from zero.  The limited 
information on debt structure in Compustat no doubt introduces noise in zombie assignments and we did 
explore many alternatives to deal with this.  But this result suggests to us that there is not a mechanical 
reason to find that φ is significantly negative in this type of regression.  
25 We thank two anonymous referees for suggesting this approach.   34
percentage anymore, but we can still estimate φ, which is the primary coefficient of 
interest.
27 
  Second, we seek to find other controls for business opportunities for the healthy 
firms.  Our main control to address this problem is to add current sales growth of each 
firm to the regression specification.   Thus, our second alternative specification is: 
 
ijt 3 jt ijt ijt jt ijt ijt Activity =   δ D +  nonz  +  nonz *Z   +   +  v         s βϕ θ ′  (28) 
 
where sijt is the growth rate of sales and the other variables are defined as in the previous 
two equations.
28   
  The next three columns in Table 3 show that controlling for the full set of 
interactions between industry and time dummies leads to modest changes in the 
estimates; the estimate of φ for the employment growth is now only different from zero at 
the six percent level of significance.  These estimates suggest to us that unobserved time-
varying industry-specific shocks are not driving the results.  
  The final three columns in the table show the results when sales growth is 
included as additional control.  For the investment specification, this type of accelerator 
specification generally performs quite well in a-theoretic horse-races among competing 
specifications (see Bernanke, Bohn and Reiss (1988)).   We recognize that the inclusion 
of  sales growth in the employment and productivity specifications is questionable, but it 
shows up as highly significant in those specifications as well (and it is hardly obvious 
which other balance sheet or income statement variables would be better pretty proxies 
                                                                                                                                                 
26 For instance, if industry-specific policies by the government were time-varying this specification would 
controll for the changes.   
27 We could go further and add firm-fixed effects to control for all the factors that are not included in the 
regression that are specific to each firm.  However, if the zombie status of firms is persistent over time, this 
approach loses much of the useful information   Nonetheless, we estimated regression (27) controlling for 
firm fixed-effects.  Surprisingly, the estimate of φ continues to be negative and significant in the investment 
and employment regressions.  The results for the productivity regression change.  The point estimate of φ is 
now negative but it is not significantly different from zero.     
28 We also allowed the coefficient on sales growth to differ for non-zombies, but the slope was never 
different, so to save space we only report the estimates that impose the same coefficient for both types of 
firms.    35
for potential growth opportunities).
29  Controlling for sales growth raises the adjusted R
2 
for all three equations, and further reduces the estimate of φ for the employment 
specification, so that it is only different from zero at 20 percent level of significance.    
  In Appendix 2, we report a long list of robustness exercises, including estimating 
of (26), (27), and (28) using alternative definition of zombies, omitting marginal zombies, 
as well as using different measures of minimum required interest rates in the construction 
of zombie indicators. While the level of significance and some of the point estimates vary 
across these multiple scenarios, the general flavor of the results does not.  More 
specifically, the estimates for φ tend to be negative and consistently significant for the 
investment regressions, negative and mostly significant for the employment regressions, 
and positive and consistently significant for the productivity regressions.   
  In the remainder of our discussion we attempt to quantify the impact of zombie 
firms on investment and employment growth of non-zombies.  We focus on the five non-
manufacturing industries, where our asset weighted measures of zombies were 
particularly high in the late 1990s.  For a typical non-zombie firm in each of these 
industries, we estimate how much more the non-zombie would have invested or increased 
employment if there had not been so many zombies in the industry.  We consider two 
alternative low zombies scenarios.  In “Case 1,” we assume that the zombie index stayed 
at its average value from 1981 through 1992 for each industry and calculate how much 
more a typical non-zombie firm would have invested (or employed) over the next ten 
years.  In “Case 2,” we assume that the zombie index for the industry was the same as 
that for manufacturing for each year from 1993 to 2002.  We calculate the cumulative 
investment under these two scenarios and compare it to the typical amount of annual 
investment (defined as the average of the median rates) during this period.   For 
employment, we compare the cumulative decline attributable to the zombies with the 
typical annual change over the period (again defined as the average of the median rates).  
In all of these calculations we take the regression estimates based on the crisp zombie 
                                                 
29 As an anonymous referee pointed out, it is possible to derive an equation relating employment to past 
sales as an optimizing choice in which a firm attempts to keep its labor sales ratio close to a desired level in 
the presence of labor adjustment costs.  In this case, employment growth depends on the lagged sales and 
employment levels.  We estimated the regressions of this type with lagged (log of) sales and lagged (log of) 
the employment as additional variables (with or without sales growth) and found that the estimate of φ is 
still negative and statistically significant.   36
indices in Table 2 using the first specification in the table, and ignore any feedback from 
industry equilibrium considerations. 
  More specifically, the investment (or employment) is estimated to have been 
higher than the actual level by  ˆˆ () ( ) actual zombie index alternative zombie index χ ϕ + − .  
Noting the possibility that the industry zombie index may be proxying for unobservable 
industry-year specific profitability shock, one can argue that this calculation 
overestimates the pure impact of zombies by including the estimate of χ.  To address this 
concern, we also report  ˆ() actual zombie index alternative zombie index ϕ − , which would be 
a lower bound for the pure zombie impact. Of course, all these estimates are subject to 
substantial uncertainty and do not take into consideration general equilibrium effects, but 
they are still informative and suggestive of the large negative impact of zombies. 
  Table 4 shows that both investment and employment growth in non-zombie firms 
would have been higher in all these industries had there been less zombies.  In some 
industries, the difference is quite large.  For example, for the typical non-zombie firm in 
the wholesale industry the cumulative investment loss (compared with the hypothetical 
case where the zombie index remained to be at its 1981-1992 average) was about 43.2% 
of capital, which was more than 3.5 years worth of investment during this period.   Even 
the lower bound estimate that includes only the differential effects on non-zombies 
(calculated from the coefficient estimate on the interaction term) shows the cumulative 
loss of 17% of capital, which is still more than one year worth of investment.   
  The effects on employment growth are large as well.  For example, the 
employment growth of a typical non-zombie real estate developer would have been 
higher by 9.5 percentage points at the end of the period if the zombie percentage had not 
risen (which can be compared to the average hiring in the industry of 0.62% per year).  
Even the lower bound estimate shows that employment growth at a typical non-zombie in 
the real estate industry would have been higher by more than 3 percentage points.  
 
6. Final Remarks 
Our mechanism has aspects of conventional credit crunch stories, but it is also 
distinct. In our model, the essence of a credit crunch acts as a reduced form profit shock.  
Thus, if a pure contraction in credit availability was all that was going on, the economy   37
would be expected to behave like the normal benchmark case we analyze, with a rise in 
destruction and a fall in creation.  Instead, the data show that destruction falls more in the 
sectors with more zombies, suggesting there is more than a simple credit crunch story at 
work.
 30  
At the same time, we do not dispute the observation that credit availability was 
likely to have fluctuated in the wake of the asset price collapse.  Accordingly, it is not 
surprising that studies such as Kitasaka and Ogawa (2000) find evidence of a classic 
credit crunch.  
Rather than positing and trying to test between more complicated versions of the 
zombie and credit-crunch hypotheses, we think it is more important to recognize that 
these mechanisms are fundamentally complementary.  If there were financial frictions 
then the zombie congestion would exacerbate them by lowering collateral values (even 
for healthy firms).  Thus, we see the spillover effects of the zombies as being the most 
important to emphasize.  
  One key characteristic of our mechanism is that zombies create on-going 
distortions that lower job creation and industry productivity.  A straightforward extension 
of the model would make long-run productivity growth endogenous. In this case the 
present value of the costs due to the suppression of restructuring generated by continuing 
forbearance with the zombies would greatly exceed calculation based only on the direct 
costs of subsidies. 
  While our model is not structural enough to provide an analysis of optimal 
government regulation, or to assess whether the costs in terms of productivity loss were 
outweighed by the benefits of reduced unemployment, we argue that Japanese regulators 
may have failed to recognize the large costs of allowing zombies to continue operating 
during the episode.  For example, the capital injections given to Japanese banks in the 
late 1990s did not recapitalize the banks sufficiently so that they no longer had an 
                                                 
30 For example, one may argue that a credit crunch could depress creation particularly if it hits small and 
young firms.  However, these firms are not the typical ones in our sample of publicly traded firms.  
Moreover, we do not observe the spike in job destruction that would accompany a credit crunch that afflicts 
small firms disproportionately.  Finally, if we assume that smaller firms’ main credit source is from banks, 
then the observation that the distortions are bigger when there are more zombies in the same industry, 
would require a very special pattern of lending.  The banks would have to be financing more small firms in 
precisely the industries where the zombies became most important.  We are unaware of any evidence 
suggesting that this was the case.   38
incentive to evergreen.    The forgone benefits that would have accrued had Japan 
returned at that point to having a normally functioning economy could have been large 
enough to justify a very generous transition policy package to the displaced workers that 
would have been released if the zombies were shuttered.
31  
  Finally, our description of the Japanese experience is similar to the diagnosis that 
has been used to describe the early phases of the transition of many former socialist 
economies to become market-oriented.  In these economies the depressing effects on the 
private sector of the continued operation of state-owned enterprises (typically funded by 
state owned banks) is often noted; discussions of the situation in China in the 2000s 
would be the latest of these examples.  Also, note that the key to our mechanism is lack 
of restructuring, which also may be caused by legal bankruptcy procedures that protect 
debtors rather than by banks’ behavior.  For example, in the U.S. airline industry it is 
routinely asserted that the industry has been plagued because unprofitable carriers go 
bankrupt, yet they fail to exit the industry (see Wessel and Carey (2005)).  These cases 
suggest that the mechanism that we have sketched is not unique to Japan.
32   
                                                 
31 The same reasoning applies to the question of whether the lack of liquidations in the U.S. airline industry 
raised or lowered the taxpayers’ costs of rationalizing the industry.  
32 See Caballero (2007) for a discussion of different models and manifestations of sclerosis in 
macroeconomics.   39
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Appendix 1  
 
  The variable R
* plays a critical role in our analysis.  In this appendix we provide 
some additional details on the construction of this variable and the other data used in the 
analysis.   
  In constructing R
* our goal is to produce a plausible lower bound for what firms 
might pay to borrow.  For the portion of the interest payments coming from short term 
bank loans, which accounts for about 40% to 45% of total lending in our sample, we 
believe that this is straightforward because almost no loans are made at rates below the 
prime rate (once we take into account all the origination and other fees).  Thus, we view 
the use of the short term prime rate as relatively uncontroversial.
33     
  Ideally, we would find an equally conservative assumption for handling long-term 
loans. It is quite likely that interest payment on a new long-term loan would be above the 
prime rate at the time the loan is originated.  Unfortunately, the available data on long-
term bank debt gives just the stock outstanding without information on the exact maturity 
of the loans.  Thus, we assume that each firm’s long term loans have an average maturity 
of 2.5 years and with one-fifth of them having been originated in each year for five years.  
Five years corresponds to the average maturity of bank loans at the time of origination in 
the dataset of Smith (2003).  This assumption implies that the right interest rate is an 
equally weighted average of the last five years of the long-term prime rates.  Thus, we 
calculate the minimum required interest payment on the long-term loans by multiplying 
the outstanding long-term loans of all maturities with the five year average of the long-
term prime rates.    
  Turning to the non-bank financing, we know that during the 1990s, roughly 40% 
of interest paying debt was bonds and about 3% was commercial paper. Our measure of 
the required payment ignores the interest payments for commercial paper.  Given the 
limited importance of commercial paper financing and the low interest rates on the 
commercial paper for the 1990s, this is not likely to cause any serious problems for our 
analysis.  
                                                 
33 As alternative we instead computed a required rate that imposed a mark up over the London Interbank 
Borrowing (LIBOR) rate based on the average spreads reported in Smith (2003).  This approach produced 
similar results regarding the numbers of firms with negative interest rate gaps.     45
  For the remaining debt we assume that it was financed as advantageously as 
possible.  Specifically, we assume that bond financing is done with CBs (which by their 
nature have lower yields) and that firms were always able to time the issues so that the 
rate is the lowest within the last five years.  Implicitly, this presumes that the firms have 
perfect foresight and refinance their bonds every time there is a local trough in interest 
rates.  This assumption is almost surely understating the required payments on corporate 
debt.  For instance, from 1996 onwards this imputation procedure assumes that all bond 
financing is done at a zero interest rate.  By assuming very low required interest rates on 
bonds, the approach reduces the risk of our misclassifying credit worthy companies that 
enjoy extreme low bond rates in the public market as zombies.  On the other hand, the 
approach increases the risk of failing to identify the zombies that pay interests on the 
bonds they issued in the past.  Thus, we can be confident that any firms that we label as 
zombies must be getting very favorable interest rates from their banks. Put differently, by 
assuming access to such low bond financing rates our classification scheme picks out 
only the most egregious zombies that receive massive help from their banks.  
  Besides this baseline procedure we also explored several approaches.  One 
alternative centered on estimating the maturity structure of each firm each year. Here we 
just describe the calculation for long-term bank borrowing.  We estimate the maturity 
structure of bonds in the same way. 
We observe the total long-term bank borrowing for firm i at the end of accounting 
year t ( it BL ) and the long-term bank borrowing that comes due within 1 year ( 1it BL ).  Let 
it NBL  be the amount of new long-term bank loans that the firm i takes in during year t.  
We use the following equation to estimate  it NBL : 
  { } 11 max 1 ,0 it it it it NBL BL BL BL −− =− + 
Let ( )it BPn  denote the amount of long-term bank loans to firm i that was given in year t-
n and still outstanding at the end of t.  We assume the maximum maturity of long-term 
bank loans to be 10 years.  If NBL is available for all years in the past 10 years, we can 
estimate BP(n) recursively as follows.   46
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If  1 it n NBL −− is not available for n ≥ n*, we stop the iteration at n = n* and assume that 
the remaining borrowings (if any) are uniformly distributed across different maturities.  
Formally, this implies: 
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The associated regression results are shown in Table A-4 (that we discuss in Appendix 2).  
  For bonds, we also adopted an extremely conservative approach that assumes the 
minimum required interest rate for bonds was zero for the entire sample period. This 
approach guarantees that any firms with a negative interest rate gap must be receiving 
unusually low interest rates on their bank borrowing.  The regressions associated with 
this classification scheme are shown in Table A-5 (and are almost identical to those 
shown in Table 2).  
The data for prime bank loan rates are taken from the Bank of Japan web site 
(http://www.boj.or.jp/en/stat/stat_f.htm).  The subscribers’ yields for convertible bonds 
are collected from various issues of Kin’yu Nenpo (Annual Report on Finance) published 
by the Ministry of Finance.   
The remaining data we use for the regression analyses are taken from the Nikkei 
Needs Corporate Financial Database.  The data are annual, so for instance when we refer 
to 1993 data they are from a firm’s balance sheet and income statement for the 
accounting year that ended between January and December of 1993.  The basic properties 
for sample as of 1993 are shown in Table A-6.     47
Roughly 2/3 of the sample assets are in manufacturing firms.  Among 
manufacturing industries the coverage of the sample is consistent and fairly high.  This is 
formalized in columns 4 and 5 that compare assets (and sales) for the different industries 
to their economy-wide counterparts (that are computed from the Ministry of Finance’s 
Statistical Survey of Incorporated Businesses (Hōjin Kigyō T ōkei Chōsa)).  The 
comparison is not exact because the industry classification system used by the MOF 
Survey differs from the one used in the Nikkei Database.  Among the industries in Table 
A-6, the MOF Survey does not separately identify medical products, rubber products, 
shipbuilding, and other transportation equipment (i.e. the portion excluding ships and 
motor vehicles).  
The industry composition for manufacturing firms in our sample is also 
relatively stable over time.  For instance, in terms of the percentage of sample assets in 
the various industries there are virtually no changes between 1993 and 2001; the only 
cases where the shares differed by more than one percentage point were electric 
machinery (which gained about 1.75 percentage points and steel which lost about 1.3 
percentage points).  Between 1981 and 1993 many of the heavy industries (e.g. chemicals, 
petroleum and coal, non-ferrous metal products, non-electrical machinery, and 
shipbuilding) shrank and electrical machinery gained over three percentage points.   
The coverage is less complete for non-manufacturing firms (see again columns 4 
and 5).  In the real estate and services industries, our sample firms covered only 8% and 
6% respectively of the whole industry in 1993, reflecting the many (unlisted) firms in 
those industries that are excluded from our analysis.   
As of 1981, the percentage of the sample assets in these firms stood at roughly 
25 percent, and that climbed to about 1/3 by 1993, with all industries except wholesaling 
gaining at least one percentage point.  From 1993 to 2001, construction firms percentage 
of sample assets shrunk by 3.5 percentage points and retail and service firm picked up 
most of the share. 
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Appendix 2 
 
  We checked the robustness of the significance of the estimated φ’s to several 
alternative measures of the required minimum interest rate r* and zombie indices. Table 
A-1 repeats the regressions from Table 3, using the fuzzy zombie indices with (d1, d2) = 
(0, 50bp) and (d1, d2) = (-25bp, 75bp).   We draw three conclusions from this table.  First, 
the estimates of φ are smaller than those in Table 3.  However, part of the difference can 
be explained by the fact that the industry zombie percentages are larger when we use the 
fuzzy zombie measures than when we use the crisp measures.  Second, and probably 
related, for the estimates of (26), the statistical significance of the estimates of φ is 
similar to those reported in Table 3; in other words, the declines in the size of the 
coefficients are accompanied by smaller standard errors, so that the t-statistics are similar.  
  Adding sales growth to these regressions lowers the statistical significance of the 
estimates of φ. The estimated signs remain negative for employment and investment and 
positive for productivity but the coefficient for employment growth is no longer 
significant.   
  We also estimated the regressions dropping the observations with xit between d1 
and d2 entirely.  Table A-2 shows the results.  The estimates of φ in the investment and 
employment growth equations are again negative and statistically significant in almost all 
the cases.  Indeed, the coefficients are often larger when we drop the observations with xit 
close to zero.  For the productivity proxy, however, the estimated gap between the 
zombies and non-zombies (β in equation (26)) rises substantially, while the estimated 
value of φ falls and becomes insignificant.   
  We also re-estimated equation (26) and (27) for different zombie definitions 
shown in Table 2.  The first panel in Table A-3 summarizes these results by reporting the 
estimates of φ in equation (26), and the second panel shows the equation (27) estimates.   
As a benchmark, the first row of estimates in each panel repeats the results from Tables 3 
and A-1 for the baseline crisp and fuzzy definitions.  Because the different zombie 
definitions change the estimated levels of zombies, we do not expect the point estimates 
for these interaction terms to be the same across specifications; the more conservative 
definitions would likely yield higher coefficients than the more liberal definitions.     49
Accordingly, we focus more on the statistical significance of the results, rather than the 
magnitudes of the estimates.  
  The most striking pattern in the table is in the last two rows of each panel.  These 
alternatives use more liberal definitions of which firms should be considered as zombies.  
For employment and productivity, especially for the fuzzy definitions, the significance of 
the estimates rises substantially.  This suggests to us that the baseline definitions are too 
restrictive and may miss many zombies.    
     The other noticeable pattern is that automatically excluding firms with BBB rated 
bonds leads to higher estimated standard errors.  With this definition the estimated 
significance of φ is lower in almost all cases.   For these specifications the estimates for 
employment are typically not significant for either the crisp or fuzzy definitions.  The 
definitions that exclude the firms with A rated bonds are somewhat similar, but the 
differences with the baseline specifications are much less pronounced.  
  A third observation is that the significance levels using the full set of industry-
time dummies (equation (27) estimates) are typically lower than for baseline equation 
(26) estimates.  The difference is most clearly seen for the employment regressions, but 
the same pattern seems to hold for the productivity and investment specifications.   
  Beyond these observations, we see no obvious patterns.  For some definitions, the 
significance rises, but in others it drops.         
  Table A-4 shows the results using more detailed estimation of the maturity 
structure for long-term borrowings and bonds discussed in Appendix 1.  The coefficient 
estimates of φ are similar (in size and statistical significance) to those in Table 3 in all the 
specifications.     
  Finally, Table A-5 shows the regressions under alternative assumption that the 
minimum required interest rate on bonds is zero.  The results are again similar to those in 
Table 3, although for the employment specification with full interactions of time and year 
dummies, the estimate of φ is insignificant.  
  All in all, the results of these robustness exercises confirm the same broad 
patterns as in Table 3. The precision of some of our estimates suffer as we modify the 
measures of zombies to address different measurement and classification errors. However,   50
the statistical significance of the estimates of φ for the investment and the productivity 
specifications is especially robust. 
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Table 1 
Search Results For News Articles Regarding Restructured Companies  
 
Total Hits for January 1990 through May 2004  1,196 
Of which, related to private sector companies in Japan  1,085 
Clear description of the content of “financial assistance” 
(excludes duplicate articles on the same case) 
120 
•   New loans  19 
•   Interest concessions （ （金 金利 利減 減免 免） ）  36 
•   Purchase of new shares （ （新 新株 株引 引き き受 受け け） ）  29 
•   Debt-Equity swaps  26 
•   Debt forgiveness  （ （債 債権 権放 放棄 棄） ）  44 
•   Moratorium on loan principle （ （元 元本 本支 支払 払猶 猶予 予） ）  11 
•   Moratorium on interest payments （ （利 利子 子支 支払 払猶 猶予 予） ）  5 
 
Notes:  Search words: “Financial assistance” AND (“Management Reconstruction Plan” OR 
(“Corporation” and “Reconstruction”)); actual phrases were 金融支援 AND (経営再建計画 OR 
(企業 AND 再建)).       
 
Source:  Nikkei Telecom 21.    52
Table 2 
Correlation between Crisp Asset-weighted Zombie Percentage and the Alternatives 









Z01  1.0000  14.96% 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Z02  0.9900  21.40% 0.9787 0.9580 0.8648 0.9839 0.9784
Z03  0.9910  22.42% 0.9768 0.9529 0.8554 0.9860 0.9816
ZA01  0.9985  13.34% 0.9953 0.9785 0.9997 0.9977 0.9807
ZA02  0.9867  10.65% 0.9807 0.9430 0.9975 0.9892 0.9673
ZA03  0.9810  14.13% 0.9734 0.9675 0.9204 0.9774 0.9508
ZA04  0.9607  14.14% 0.9456 0.9474 0.8067 0.9548 0.8532
ZA05  0.9851  19.79% 0.9645 0.9179 0.8575 0.9756 0.9576
ZA06  0.9748  17.09% 0.9445 0.8674 0.8620 0.9658 0.9566
ZA07  0.9743  20.62% 0.9583 0.9387 0.8639 0.9726 0.9275
ZA08  0.9467  20.50% 0.9225 0.9193 0.7770 0.9575 0.8255
ZA09  0.9875  22.17% 0.9636 0.9548 0.8532 0.9823 0.9683
ZA10  0.9855  20.70% 0.9595 0.9550 0.8529 0.9793 0.9643
ZA11  0.9725  21.08% 0.9516 0.9372 0.8442 0.9746 0.9303
ZA12  0.9434  21.01% 0.9150 0.9161 0.7438 0.9592 0.8300
ZA13  0.9796  17.42% 0.9764 0.9752 0.8740 0.9742 0.9454
ZA14  0.9692  19.72% 0.9602 0.9691 0.7853 0.9613 0.8723
ZA15  0.9707  24.68% 0.9522 0.9358 0.7881 0.9659 0.9058
ZA16  0.9485  27.62% 0.9142 0.9210 0.7481 0.9584 0.8041
ZA17  0.9676  25.16% 0.9463 0.9416 0.7508 0.9706 0.9163
ZA18  0.9429  28.21% 0.9097 0.9291 0.6640 0.9625 0.8321
Note: The first column shows the (alternative) zombie definition.  The column “2002 Zombie%” reports the 2002 
(asset weighted) zombie percentage for all firms calculated using the various definitions.  The other columns show 
the correlation coefficient between the zombie indicator calculated using the various definitions and the baseline 
crisp zombie indicator (Z01) for the sample of firms indicated in the header row.    
(Alternative) Definitions:   
Z01  Baseline crisp zombie definition (d1, d2) = (0,0) 
Z02  Baseline fuzzy zombie with (d1, d2) = (0, 0.005) 
Z03  Baseline fuzzy zombie with (d1, d2) = (-0.0025, 0.0075) 
ZA01  Crisp zombie excluding firms with bonds rated A or above 
ZA02  Crisp zombie excluding firms with bonds rated BBB or above 
ZA03  Crisp zombie 2-year average of years t and t-1 
ZA04  Crisp zombie 3-year average of years t, t-1 and t-2 
ZA05  Fuzzy zombie with (d1, d2) = (0, 0.005) excluding firms with bonds rated A or above 
ZA06  Fuzzy zombie with (d1, d2) = (0, 0.005) excluding firms with bonds rated BBB or above 
ZA07  Fuzzy zombie 2-year average of years t and t-1 with (d1, d2) = (0, 0.005) 
ZA08  Fuzzy zombie 3-year average of years t, t-1 and t-2 with (d1, d2) = (0, 0.005) 
ZA09  Fuzzy zombie with (d1, d2) = (-0.0025, 0.0075) excluding firms with bonds rated A or above 
ZA10  Fuzzy zombie with (d1, d2) = (-0.0025, 0.0075) excluding firms with bonds rated BBB or above 
ZA11  Fuzzy zombie 2-year average of years t and t-1 with (d1, d2) = (-0.0025, 0.0075) 
ZA12  Fuzzy zombie 3-year average of years t, t-1 and t-2 with (d1, d2) = (-0.0025, 0.0075) 
ZA13  Crisp zombie 2-year maximum of years t and t-1 
ZA14  Crisp zombie 3-year maximum of years t, t-1 and t-2 
ZA15  Fuzzy zombie 2-year maximum of years t and t-1 with (d1, d2) = (0, 0.005) 
ZA16  Fuzzy zombie 3-year maximum of years t, t-1 and t-2 with (d1, d2) = (0, 0.005) 
ZA17  Fuzzy zombie 2-year maximum of years t and t-1 with (d1, d2) = (-0.0025, 0.0075) 
ZA18  Fuzzy zombie 3-year maximum of years t, t-1 and t-2 with (d1, d2) = (-0.0025, 0.0075)   53
Table 3 
Impact of Zombie Firms on the Investment, Employment and Productivity of Non-Zombies 
Using Baseline Zombie Estimates 
 
 
Dependent Variable   I/K   ∆Log E  Log Sales  
–  ⅔ Log E  
–  ⅓ Log K 
I/K  ∆Log E  Log Sales  
–  ⅔ Log E  
–  ⅓ Log K 
I/K  ∆Log E  Log Sales  
–  ⅔ Log E  


































































Yes No No 
 







Yes No No 
 
















Number  of  obs.  22,396 22,429 23,090 22,396  22,429 23,090 22,394 22,428 22,847 
2 R   0.0537 0.0895 0.3599 0.0617  0.1007 0.3590 0.1125 0.1794 0.3705 
 
The sample consists of between 1,844 and 2,506 publicly traded firms (depending on the year).  Each regression is estimated after trimming the top 
and bottom 2.5% of observations (based on the dependent variable).  White (1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient 
estimate.  Point estimates for the various dummies variables are omitted from the table. Any firm with actual interest payments below the hypothetical 
minimum is considered a zombie and any firm where this is not true is a non-zombie (d1=d2=0 in equation (1)).  Two digit industry classifications are 
used throughout.   The industry percentages for zombies are based on the share of total industry assets residing in zombie firms.    I/K is the ratio of 
investment in depreciable assets to beginning of period stock of depreciable assets (measured at book value).  E is the total number of full time 
employees.  K is the book value of depreciable assets and sales growth is the log difference of each firm’s sales.    
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Table 4 
Cumulative Impact of Zombie Firms on Non-Zombies 
 
A. Cumulative investment losses (1993-2002) of the median non-zombie firm in the high zombies industries 
Industry Wholesale  Retail  Construction  Real  Estate  Services 
Actual Average I/K: 1993-2002  0.1184  0.1871  0.1373  0.0920  0.2215 





































“Actual Average I/K: 1993-2002” shows the actual average investment rate (I/K) of the median non-zombie firm in the industry for 1993-
2002.  “Cumulative Lost I/K Case 1” shows the total amount of investment (I/K) of the typical non-zombie that was depressed during the 
period compared with the hypothetical case where the asset weighted zombie index had stayed at its average level for 1981-1992.  
“Cumulative Lost I/K Case 2” shows the total amount of investment (I/K) of the typical non-zombie that was depressed during the period 
compared with the hypothetical case where the asset weighted zombie index of the industry was the same as that of manufacturing in each 
year from 1993 to 2002.  The coefficient estimates from the regression in the column 2 of Table 2 were used for the calculation.  The 
numbers in the parentheses show the “lower bounds” of the cumulative losses that include only the differential impacts on the non-zombie 
(calculated from the coefficient estimate on the interaction term). 
 
B. Cumulative employment change (1993-2002) of the median non-zombie firm in the high zombies industries 
 
Industry Wholesale  Retail  Construction  Real  Estate  Services 
Average Actual Employment growth:  
1993-2002 
-0.0136 0.0015  -0.0043 0.0062  0.0140 



































(0.0602)   55
 
“Average Actual Employment Growth: 1993-2002” shows the actual average annual rate of change in the employment at the median non-
zombie in the industry for 1993-2002.  “Cumulative lost employment Case 1” shows the total rate of new hiring at the typical non-zombie 
that was depressed during this period compared with the hypothetical case where the asset weighted zombie index had stayed at its 
average level for 1981-1992.  “Cumulative lost employment Case 2” shows the total rate of new hiring at the typical non-zombie that was 
depressed during the period compared with the hypothetical case where the asset weighted zombie index of the industry was the same as 
that of manufacturing in each year from 1993 to 2002. The coefficient estimates from the regression in the column 3 of Table 2 were used 
for the calculation.  The numbers in the parentheses show the “lower bounds” of the cumulative losses that include only the differential 
impacts on the non-zombie (calculated from the coefficient estimate on the interaction term). 




Impact of Zombie Firms on the Investment, Employment and Productivity of Non-Zombies 
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⅔ Log E 
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points) in eq. (1) 
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Yes Yes  Yes 
 
No No  No 
 














Number  of  obs.  22,396  22,429 22,847 22,396  22,429  22,847 22,394 22,428 22,847 
2 R   0.0556  0.0897 0.3631 0.0624  0.1003  0.3620 0.1133 0.1791 0.3709   57
Table A-1 continued 
 
 
The sample consists of between 1,844 and 2,506 publicly traded firms (depending on the year).  Each regression is estimated after trimming the top 
and bottom 2.5% of observations (based on the dependent variable).  White (1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient 
estimate.  Point estimates for dummies are omitted.  The zombie probabilities are calculated as described in the text using equation (1).  Two digit 
industry classifications are used throughout.   The industry percentages for zombies are based on the share of total industry assets residing in zombie 
firms.  Sales growth is the log difference of each firm’s sales.  I/K is the ratio of investment in depreciable assets to beginning of period stock of 
depreciable assets (measured at book value).  E is the total number of full time employees.  K is the book value of depreciable assets.  Sample period is 
1993 to 2002.  
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No No  No 
 




Yes Yes  Yes 
 
No No  No 
 














Number  of  obs.  22,396  22,429 22,847 22,396  22,429  22,847 22,394 22,428 22,847 
2 R   0.0559  0.0898 0.3630 0.0624  0.1003  0.3622 0.1132 0.1791 0.3710   58
Table A-2 
Impact of Zombie Firms on the Investment, Employment and Productivity of Non-Zombies 
  Excluding observations with the interest rate gap close to zero   
Dependent 
Variable 
              I/K  ∆Log E  Log Sales  
   – ⅔ Log E   
  –  ⅓ Log K 
              I/K  ∆Log E  Log Sales 
–  ⅔ Log E 
–  ⅓ Log K 
Range of excluded 
obs (in basis points) 
{0, 50}  {-25,  
-75} 
{0, 50} {-25,     
-75} 
{0, 50} {-25,     
-75} 
{0, 50} {-25, 
75} 
{0, 50} {-25,     
-75} 















































































Yes No No 
 







Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes No No 
 


















Number  of  obs.      17,407 14,161 17,389 14,138 17,697 14,384 17,407 14,161 17,389 14,138 17,697 14,384 
2 R   0.0556 0.0457 0.0897 0.0792 0.3652 0.3595 0.0595 0.0568 0.0981 0.0898 0.3643 0.3580 
 
The sample consists of between 1,844 and 2,506 publicly traded firms (depending on the year).  Each regression is estimated after trimming the top 
and bottom 2.5% of observations (based on the dependent variable).  White (1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient 
estimate.  Industry and year dummies are also included in each regression.  Any firm with actual interest payments below the hypothetical minimum is 
considered a zombie and any firm where this is not true is a non-zombie (d1=d2=0 in equation (1)).  Two digit industry classifications are used 
throughout.   The industry percentages for zombies are based on the share of total industry assets residing in zombie firms.  Sales growth is the log 
difference of each firm’s sales.  I/K is the ratio of investment in depreciable assets to beginning of period stock of depreciable assets (measured at book 
value).  E is the total number of full time employees.  K is the book value of depreciable assets.  Sample period is 1993 to 2002.    59
Table A-3 
Impact of Zombie Firms on the Investment, Employment and Productivity of Non-Zombies 
for Alternative Zombie Definitions from Table 2 
  
  Reported Estimates and standard errors on Non-Zombie*Industry Zombie % 
as estimated from equation (26) 
                 I/K  ∆Log E  Log Sales –  ⅔ Log E 
–  ⅓ Log K 
{d1, d2} (in basis 
points) in eq. (1) 
{0, 0}  {0, 50}  {-25, 75}  {0, 0}  {0, 50}  {-25, 75}  {0, 0}  {0, 50}  {-25, 75} 
Baseline from 
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Table A-3 continued 
 
  Reported Estimates and standard errors on Non-Zombie*Industry Zombie % 
as estimated from equation (27) 
                 I/K  ∆Log E  Log Sales –  ⅔ Log E 
–  ⅓ Log K 
{d1, d2} (in basis 
points) in eq. (1) 
{0, 0}  {0, 50}  {-25, 75}  {0, 0}  {0, 50}  {-25, 75}  {0, 0}  {0, 50}  {-25, 75} 
Baseline from 
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Table A-4 
Impact of Zombie Firms on the Investment, Employment and Productivity of Non-Zombies 
Using Estimated Maturity Structure for Long-term Borrowings and Bonds 
 
Dependent Variable   I/K   ∆Log E  Log Sales –  ⅔ Log E  
–  ⅓ Log K 
I/K  ∆Log E  Log Sales  –  ⅔ Log E  



































    


















Yes No  No 
 
No 
Year dummies included?  Yes  Yes 
 












Number of obs.  22,396  22,429  22,847  22,396  22,429  22,847 
2 R   0.0521 0.0897  0.3614  0.0611  0.1013  0.3608 
 
The sample consists of between 1,844 and 2,506 publicly traded firms (depending on the year).  Each regression is estimated after trimming the top 
and bottom 2.5% of observations (based on the dependent variable).  White (1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient 
estimate.  Estimates of the various dummies variables are omitted from the table. Any firm with actual interest payments below the hypothetical 
minimum is considered a zombie and any firm where this is not true is a non-zombie (d1=d2=0 in equation (1)); the imputed interest rates for bank 
borrowing and bonds are modified as described in Appendix A-2.  Two digit industry classifications are used throughout.   The industry percentages 
for zombies are based on the share of total industry assets residing in zombie firms.  Sales is the reported sales for each firm.  I/K is the ratio of 
investment in depreciable assets to beginning of period stock of depreciable assets (measured at book value).  E is the total number of full time 
employees.  K is the book value of depreciable assets.   
 




Impact of Zombie Firms on the Investment, Employment and Productivity of Non-Zombies 
Assuming Zero for the Minimum Required Interest Rate on Bonds 
 
Dependent Variable   I/K   ∆Log E  Log Sales –  ⅔ Log E 
–  ⅓ Log K 
I/K  ∆Log E  Log Sales –  ⅔ Log E  



































    


















Yes No  No 
 
No 
Year dummies included?  Yes  Yes 
 












Number of obs.  22,396  22,429  23,090  22,396  22,429  23,090 
2 R   0.0521 0.0897  0.3614  0.0616  0.1150  0.3590 
 
The sample consists of between 1,844 and 2,506 publicly traded firms (depending on the year).  Each regression is estimated after trimming the top 
and bottom 2.5% of observations (based on the dependent variable).  White (1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient 
estimate.  Estimates of the various dummies variables are omitted from the table. Any firm with actual interest payments below the hypothetical 
minimum is considered a zombie and any firm where this is not true is a non-zombie (d1=d2=0 in equation (1)); the imputed interest rates for bonds is 
assumed to be zero, see the discussion in Appendix A-2.  Two digit industry classifications are used throughout.   The industry percentages for 
zombies are based on the share of total industry assets residing in zombie firms.  Sales is the reported sales for each firm.  I/K is the ratio of investment 
in depreciable assets to beginning of period stock of depreciable assets (measured at book value).  E is the total number of full time employees.  K is 
the book value of depreciable assets.     63
 
Table A-6 
Sample Summary Statistics for 1993 
 













      Assets  Sales  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev.
All 2360  100.00 23.60% 20.12% 127310 344850  21024 63792 3.2969 0.7249
Food products  125  4.41 40.22% 37.11% 105890 219310  24463 55329 3.3852 0.4564
Textile mill products  76  2.18 64.55% 50.37% 86085 154430 16998 33124 3.0227 0.5949
Paper & allied products  38  1.72 51.17% 37.91% 136270 185260 49558 70452 2.9394 0.3010
Chemicals 181  7.15 52.67% 50.35% 118730 202980  27962 50293 3.0914 0.3106
Medical products  47  2.18 -- 139340 163500  19183 21802 2.8858 0.3438
Petroleum & coal products  13  2.39 74.21% 73.58% 553230 626230  81829 77178 4.2080 0.9285
Rubber products  23  0.90 -- 117990 228440  24910 35775 2.8311 0.3481
Ceramics 63  1.89 40.11% 32.86% 90001 159570  23248 42273 2.9405 0.4556
Steel 62  5.63 78.85% 70.32% 273040 649320  90894 228310 3.0335 0.3742
Non-ferrous metal products  129  3.80 37.88% 33.45% 88419 145930 18383 35383 3.0635 0.4797
Machinery, non-electric  223  6.31 64.68% 53.61% 85047 263680  13120 33458 2.9104 0.5123
Electric machinery  244  15.47 73.88% 62.00% 190440 561120  28122 81031 3.0086 0.4842
Shipbuilding 7  1.02 -- 439600 517490  55032 61206 3.0861 0.1967
Motor vehicles  71  7.34 63.94% 67.96% 310520 869640  69836 156410 3.0407 0.3642
Other transportation 
equipment 22  0.44 -- 60231 56628 12769 16065 2.9909 0.3580
Precision machinery  41  1.19 43.36% 40.10% 86949 129530  13817 20134 2.8800 0.5373
Misc. manufacturing  86  2.13 22.78% 19.05% 74252 148620  14858 36881 3.0892 0.4783
Construction 202  14.16 31.87% 21.34% 210620 438630  9181 20289 3.9441 0.5201
Wholesale 271  7.17 10.52% 7.59% 79455 157200 5388 9858 4.2574 0.9086
Retail 170  5.07 14.66% 13.79% 89601 151780  15395 26231 3.5671 0.4293
Real Estate  53  4.46 8.14% 11.11% 252780 516730  28285 62389 3.5030 0.6612
Services 213  3.00 5.69% 5.98% 42302 72247  7630 13154 2.9103 0.6619
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Table  A-6 (continued) 
 
Industry  Investment Rate (I/K)  Sales Growth  Employment Growth  Number of Employees 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
All 0.3284 0.7473 -0.0275 0.1548 0.0344 0.4731 1867.8 4655.4
Food products  0.2664 0.2995 0.0069 0.0682 0.0307 0.1030 1678.70 2911.20
Textile mill products  0.2482 0.4107 -0.1006 0.1138 -0.0154 0.0823 1537.90 2308.70
Paper & allied products  0.1933 0.2383 -0.0515 0.0581 -0.0061 0.0418 1529.30 1663.70
Chemicals 0.2690 0.2476 -0.0348 0.0925 0.0177 0.0942 1493.50 2248.30
Medical products  0.4017 0.5125 0.0570 0.0751 0.0222 0.0541 2264.10 2155.70
Petroleum & coal products  1.1045 2.4836 -0.0314 0.1241 0.0129 0.0704 1662.80 1363.40
Rubber products  0.2766 0.2062 -0.0506 0.0851 0.0038 0.0585 2369.30 3464.40
Ceramics 0.2471 0.2116 -0.0318 0.0843 0.0063 0.0459 1358.90 2073.50
Steel 0.1864 0.1941 -0.1131 0.0756 -0.0065 0.0835 3100.00 6720.70
Non-ferrous metal products  0.3334 0.6129 -0.0420 0.1092 0.0399 0.2082 1498.40 2171.30
Machinery, non-electric  0.3097 1.1883 -0.1172 0.2077 0.0029 0.0644 1462.90 3533.10
Electric machinery  0.2322 0.2128 -0.0720 0.1260 0.0076 0.1712 3724.30 10093.00
Shipbuilding 0.3595 0.2646 0.0075 0.0686 0.0237 0.0114 6402.60 7590.00
Motor vehicles  0.2384 0.1328 -0.0200 0.0631 0.0145 0.0345 6105.90 11750.00
Other transportation 
equipment 0.2294 0.1707 -0.0718 0.1044 -0.0119 0.0577 1207.70 962.16
Precision machinery  0.3206 0.4658 -0.1135 0.1499 -0.0141 0.0875 1809.10 2121.40
Misc. manufacturing  0.2945 0.4929 0.0044 0.1742 0.0259 0.0866 1470.40 2408.00
Construction 0.3702 0.4170 0.0378 0.0984 0.0429 0.0568 1909.10 2503.20
Wholesale 0.4219 1.2048 -0.0341 0.1163 0.0219 0.1344 888.78 1145.20
Retail 0.3936 0.6091 0.0656 0.2566 0.2276 1.7322 1736.00 2750.20
Real Estate  0.5142 1.4205 0.0094 0.2619 0.0087 0.1182 400.23 501.00
Services 0.4001 0.8900 0.0283 0.1671 0.0563 0.1847 1013.90 1315.30
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Note: Percentages calculated as described in the text, with d1=d2=0 in equation 1.   66






x  d1 d2 0 




Figure 3: Cross-Industry Incidence of Asset Weighted Zombie Percentage for Crisp and Fuzzy Zombie Definitions 
 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fuzzy with (d1, d2) = (0, 50bp)
Fuzzy with (d1, d2) = (-25bp, 75bp)  68 
 
 
Figure 4: Asset Weighted Zombie Percentages by Profitability 
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Zombies and TFP Growth
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Figure 7  
 













Source: Project on Productivity in the European Union: A Comparative Industry Approach (EU 
KLEMS2003) (http://www.euklems.net/) 